The study is based on long term reveal of Bulgarian postwar archives and discuss for the first time many still unknown episodes of the Bulgarian relations with Latin American countries in the Cold War era. The establishment and further development of the diplomatic and political relations between a small Balkan state like Bulgaria with Latin America is seen as a case study for Soviet Bloc policy in general toward the Western Hemisphere within the bipolar confrontation IR model. The study is composed in four following the most significant social and political events in the Cold War years -Cuban Revolution, Chilean leftist government of Unidad Popular, and Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, which led to the armed confrontation in Central America in the last Cold War decade. Keywords: Cold War; Soviet Bloc; Bulgaria; Latin America.
Introduction
The proposed paper was a result of a thorough research at the Bulgarian state, political, diplomatic, and intelligence archives for more than 25 years. Hopefully, the most important records of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) were made available for the whole Cold War period even in 1993, when they were transferred to the Central State Archive (TsDA). In addition, the Council of Ministers' confidential files for the same period were declassified a decade later in 2004. According to the actual legal regulation, the records of Bulgarian Security and Intelligence services can be accessed for the entire period , while the Diplomatic Archive at the Foreign Ministry in Sofia follows a "30 years" rule in its declassification process. Furthermore, working on a research project about Bulgarian political relations with Latin America, the author of that publication gained access and revealed in 1988-1989 many still unprocessed files from the "Foreign Relations" departments of both the smaller BCP governmental partner Bulgarian Agrarian National Union party and the Fatherland Front mass political organization. That long term research led to several scientific publications on the issue 2 , which are a principal base for the current summarized study on Bulgarian-Latin American political relations in the postwar world.
. It was the first official letter of this kind addressed by a Latin-American President to the communist regime of Bulgaria after the World War II.
In the second half of the 1950s diplomatic talks for renewal of the diplomatic relations of Bulgaria with other Latin-American countries were also reopened. That trend was part of the new foreign policy line which was adopted in the first years of the Soviet bloc "de-Stalinization" process. Additional reason for more intensive foreign policy activities was the Bulgarian admission into the United Nations in December 1955. Similar to some other East European countries, in the early 1956 the changes within the top echelon of Bulgarian political leadership happened. In just a few years (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) the new Communist leader Todor Zhivkov succeeded to eliminate consecutively his own rivals and to establish a monocratic power under the banner of the collective Politburo decision making.
The negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations with Uruguay started in June 1956 in Buenos Aires and were finalized successfully in May 1958. Soon after the election of the new Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek, in May 1956 in Paris started by initiative of the Bulgarian government negotiations for renewal of the diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries. Bulgarian Foreign Ministry discussed in the same time the proposal to invite a group of Brazilian senators to visit Sofia. Such an invitation was sent on behalf of the Bulgarian Parliament Soviet Bloc political relations with Latin American countries OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 (Narodno Sabranie) to the Legislative Assembly of Pernambuco 10 . In 1956 Bulgarian Ambassador in Buenos Aires visited also Chile and raised the issue for renewal of the diplomatic relations during a talk with the Chilean Foreign Minister. The political reaction against the Soviet military intervention in Hungary and the lack of interest by the government of Jorge Alessandri spoiled the eventual bilateral negotiations in the next years. However, Bulgaria renewed its diplomatic relations with Brazil in March 1961 soon after the inauguration of the new Brazilian President Janio Quadros, and with Chile -several years later under the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei.
A curious exchange of letters happened soon after the military coup in Guatemala against the leftist government of Jacobo Arbens. On 19 December 1954 the leadership of the Bulgarian youth organization (Union of People's Youth, renamed in 1958 to Dimitrov's Comsomol organization) sent a protest telegram against the detention of a large number of Guatemalan student leaders. There was received an official response in Sofia by the head of the military junta, Col. Castillo Armas, who obviously had no any information about the political regime in Bulgaria, and "competently" argued:
Currently there are no political prisoners in Guatemala, but only some criminals… You were deluded by the forged information, slyly spread throughout the world by the agents of the international Communism… I would like to assert you entirely, that currently in Guatemala exists a truly democracy.
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The Cuban Revolution and the "Rediscovery of America"
The victory of the Cuban Revolution in January 1959 and the October Missile Crisis in 1962 induced a more serious interest of the Bulgarian society in the political events in the Western Hemisphere. On its way back from Argentina and Mexico in the late May -early June 1960 a Bulgarian governmental delegation visited Cuba and had talks with Raul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara and other Cuban officials. At the end of June the proposals for the establishment of diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations and Bulgaria's rendering of economic and technical aid to Cuba were coordinated between the two governments' representatives. At the Fifteenth UN General Assembly session in September 1960 in New York the first personal meeting between Todor Zhivkov and Fidel Castro was organized. Years later Zhivkov related that their improvised unofficial meeting happened on 27 September 1960 in a small room at the Hotel Jordan Baev OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 Theresa in Harlem, where Castro also more famously met Nikita Khrushchev. On 8 October 1960 Bulgarian minister of foreign trade Luchezar Avramov and Che Guevara signed in Havana a bilateral commercial agreement. The same day an official communiqué announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Cuba.
Few months after Playa Giron invasion, the Bulgarian government responded positively to a request for arms delivery to Cuba. The arms delivery and credits to Cuba in 1961 exceeded 8 million USD. After the Cuban missile crisis CC BCP Politburo adopted another secret resolution for arms delivery to Cuba 12 . Soon after the crisis the Bulgarian-Cuban relationship attained more significance focusing on Sofia's economic, technical, and military aid for the Castro government. The first group of Bulgarian agricultural experts was prepared to be sent to Cuba in November 1962. In the next fifteen years more than 4300 Bulgarian technical and agricultural experts worked in Cuba, while only in 1962-1963 about 130 Cuban students and technicians arrived in Bulgaria to continue their education and training. 13 In May 1965 a joint intergovernmental committee for economic, scientific and technical cooperation started its work. In January 1964 Bulgarian minister of defense Gen. Dobri Djurov visited Cuba for the first time, and Raul Castro returned the visit the following March.
14 During a visit of Angel Solakov, Bulgarian State Security Chairman, to Cuba in May 1966 he discussed with Sergio Del Valle, Cuban Minister of the Interior, and Manuel PiІeiro, Cuban State Security Director, the possibility to organize sabotage and counterintelligence training for 30 Cuban officers in Bulgaria. On 8 June 1966 CC BCP Secretariat adopted a secret decision for counterintelligence training of 30 Cuban state security servicemen. Todor Zhivkov's handwritten resolution on the document stated: "We have no conditions to train people in sabotage". 15 In February 1967 a new Protocol for arms export to Cuba was signed in Havana.
On 5 October 1967 the CC BCP Politburo approved a resolution and measures for increasing and strengthening of Bulgarian-Cuban relations. However, the envisaged first visit of Todor Zhivkov to Cuba in the beginning of 1968 was postponed mainly because of the sharp anti-Soviet critique Fidel Castro made in a secret speech to a Cuban Communist Party plenary session in January 1968. The change of the official Cuban position after the Warsaw Pact military invasion in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 made possible to renew the preparation for Zhivkov's visit to Cuba, which . The guns had to be transferred by the Cubans to Latin American leftist guerrilla groups. At the same time, the Bulgarian leadership met with a degree of hostility or at least with suspicion during the next years, the strategy of the guerrilla warfare in the region, and all the requests for military training of Latin American guerrillas in Bulgaria were declined. A Bulgarian Embassy in Havana Report of March 1966 clearly stated:
We have recently sent several reports concerning the training of people in Cuba who are subsequently infiltrated back in other Latin American countries with the task to organize armed resistance… The guerrilla actions and their simultaneous opening in a wide range of countries -are considered as task number one. This strategy, its objective being to provoke imperialist occupation of the Latin American countries which will allegedly serve as an incentive for an anti-imperialist final victorious struggle, is very difficult to understand. . The new "policy, strategy and tactics related to the Latin-American continent" was predominantly motivated with the "common struggle against the American imperialism" and the strategic goal "to gradually win these countries and their peoples as our friends". 
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OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 their countries. Looking closely at the BANU international activity one can definitely say that this Bulgarian party showed far more intensive and much wider activities in comparison with similar parties and organizations in the other East European countries. It was exactly the BANU that was quite often used in the last two Cold War decades as a principal East European non-Communist organizer of representative international meetings and conferences for "détente, peace and international dialogue". This policy was supplementary to the more limited possibilities for political contacts on the part of the Communist parties. On the other hand, obviously, quite a few parties in Western Europe, Asia and the Americas did find it much more politically acceptable to maintain official relations with an agrarian rather than with a communist party in Eastern Europe.
The victory of the Unidad Popular leftist coalition in Chile in September 1970 was a significant political event, which gave a strong impetus for the development of Bulgarian-Chilean relations and was the most commented Latin American political phenomena among the Bulgarian public opinion. On 3 April 1971 CC BCP Politburo approved a special resolution for further versatile development of the bilateral relations with Chile, which was discussed during the first visit of a Chilean Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda in Bulgaria in the beginning of June same year. Another Socialist Party leader, its Secretary General Carlos Altamirano also visited Bulgaria in 1971.
In June 1971 one of the BANU leaders, Petar Tanchev, in his capacity of Deputy Prime Minister, visited twelve Latin American countries and apart of signing commercial and economic treaties there, he also had talks with leaders of various political parties in the region in his capacity of political figure. In October 1972 during a state visit in Chile a BANU Secretary, Georgi Andreev was invited to dinner in the house of the Chilean President, Salvador Allende. Then Allende informed Andreev of the opposition circles' "Plan September", the purpose of which was to destabilize the political situation in the country 26 . To Lalyu Ganchev, another agrarian party important personality, who visited Chile during the same period of time, Allende allegedly addressed an "appeal for help to the socialist countries in Europe". On the invitation of the BANU in 1972 Bulgaria was visited as well by Luis Maira Aguirre and Julio Silva Solar, two of the nine Christiandemocrat members of parliament who passed on the side of the Popular Unity Bloc -Unidad Popular. In November 1972 29 TsDA, Fond 1B, Opis 64, A.E. 435, 449, 467, 776, 807, 847, 889 . The military training of Chilean communists and socialists was given at Bulgarian military schools until 1987. In April 1988 CC BCP Secretariat declined a new request for military training with the argument that "there no exist favorable circumstances for armed resistance in Chile, which could be as well an additional factor for disunite of the anti-Pinochet political opposition in the country".
OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 in Buenos Aires Georgi Stefanov in a cable to Sofia proposed such an initiative for establishment of contacts between BANU and some leaders of the Civic Radical Union and Justisialist Party in Argentina 
OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 the Cuban Revolution became a new political Latin America phenomenon of the mid-20 th Century, the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua was notable with its attempt to achieve a new pro-Marxist social regime in the region in the last quarter of the 20 th Century. Differently from any other previous conflict in Central America, the last year of the armed struggle against Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua was rather closely monitored by the Bulgarian mass media. As early as the autumn of 1978 the Bulgarian Communist Leadership had obtained reliable information regarding the correlation of the forces in Nicaragua and established for the first time initial direct contacts with the Sandinist Front of National Liberation (FSLN). In November 1978 strictly confidential information under the title "Regarding the Events in Nicaragua" limited for circulation for the Politburo members only pointed out that the anti-Somoza struggle turns into "an event of importance beyond national borders". This analysis ended with the following conclusion: "The most probable outcome of the political crisis in Nicaragua is deposition of the Somoza regime and forming of a coalition bourgeois government" period of its turning from guerrilla forces into a regular army. According to his information, the Nicaraguan armed forces had at their disposal a small number of 'Sherman" tanks and World War II English light tanks as well as less than 10 artillery batteries with Chinese arms, obtained from Cuba. The country was practically with no Air and Naval forces since the Somoza's troops had taken away the few airplanes and coast patrol boats. The Sandinist Army only found several old British airplanes "T-28" and "T-33", one helicopter and one patrol boat. The infantry was also poorly armed with a very limited number of machine-guns and "M-16" guns. Following the information presented the Nicaraguan delegation asked for definite economic and military assistance. In reply the Bulgarian representatives promised to consider most urgently the material assistance to be extended to Nicaragua as well as the training of Sandinista military personnel in Bulgarian Military Academies. . According to the bilateral agreements for economic and technical cooperation, Bulgaria provided technical support and participated in the construction of several economic projects (the international port "El Bluff ", Mina "Vesuvio", a hydropower complex, a vegetable cannery in Sebaco Valley, a freezing plant, an agricultural plant near Bonanza, etc.). In 1982 the commercial exchange between Bulgaria and Nicaragua reached 13 mln. USD, while in 1985 it exceeded 50 mln. USD.
The political contacts between the two countries enjoyed the utmost dynamics and intensity. In the first five years after July 19 th 1979 nearly all the members of the Sandinista Leadership visited Bulgaria. In 1984, for instance, the CC BCP Secretariat voted more than ten resolutions referred to Nicaragua! During the talks with the visiting Nicaraguan delegations exchange of information and consultations regarding the situation in Central America were always the central topics. The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs held also regular consultations on the situation in the Central America with the COMECON partners, in particular, with the Foreign Ministries of the USSR, Cuba and the GDR.
Following the tacitly accepted 'division of tasks", the BANU was obviously given the task to keep in touch with political parties, rival to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). In 1981 the BANU established contacts with the People's Social-Christian Party. At that party leadership's request the BANU organized in the course of the following several months printing of a number of PSCP program and propaganda materials in Bulgaria. In 1982 the party chairman, Carlos Garcia, and in 1985 its Secretary General -Mauricio Diaz, visited Bulgaria. Soon after the 1984 elections in Nicaragua dissension arose between the PSCP and the FSLN. It is rather significant that in those circumstances the leaders of the PSCP asked their Bulgarian partner to help them settle their misunderstandings with the sandinists.
In 1986 the BANU established its first contacts with one of the oldest political parties in Nicaragua -the Conservative-Democratic Party. At the 1984 elections for President that party's candidate, Clemente Guido, came second, after Daniel Ortega, obtaining 13, 9% of the votes. In a Soviet Bloc political relations with Latin American countries OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 conversation with the the BANU leader, Petar Tanchev, during his visit in Bulgaria in July 1989 Guido declared: "Our Party supports the revolution but we are in opposition of the FSLN because they are unwilling to share the authority with any other political force."
The information received from the Bulgarian embassies in Havana and Managua show that the Bulgarian government had a realistic view of the political development in Nicaragua and the increasing problems of the country. During the second stage of the Sandinista rule (1985 -1989) Sofia continued to give the Sandinista regime considerable economic aid and foreign policy support. The agreements reached during the visit of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in Bulgaria during his tour of several European countries in April-May 1985 were of particular importance. At his talks with the Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov in the evening of May 2 nd Ortega informed that because of the devastation the country suffered in consequence of the civil war, Nicaragua needed urgent economic aid to the extent of 356 mln. USD. The Nicaraguan President informed that he had allegedly agreed with the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez to receive 25 mln. USD credit and to have the refund of other 10 mln. USD postponed. As a total the Sandinista government expected to receive form West Europe 190 mln. USD as credit and 50 mln. USD as free aid but the other funds required were to be provided by the COMECON countries. Todor Zhivkov promised that Bulgaria will give the Nicaraguan economy "considerable material aid".
43 Additional "special" assistance was promised (it actually being lights guns and electronic devices). In 1986 after talks between Todor Zhivkov and Bayardo Arce during the 27 th CPSU congress in Moscow Bulgarian government approved decision for delivery of additional 20 000 t petroleum to the previously agreed 20 000 t in 1985, and a new loan for arms and ammunitions of 10 mln. USD
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. As a total during the period 1979-1988 Bulgaria gave Nicaragua credits for more than 200 mln. USD, including 60 mln. USD free aid. In March 1989 the Council of the Ministers adopted a resolution to give Nicaragua another 2 mln. USD of free aid and to write-off a Nicaraguan debt amounting to 16 mln. USD 45 . Nicaragua and the other Central American countries were mutually bound in more than one aspect, and they followed the same line of logic. Similarly to the mutual political and military assistance which the three Central American states (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras) and their Armed Forces gave to each other and to the anti-Sandinista guerrilla groups, the guerrila forces of these three countries proceeded in the same way with the FSLN and Cuban leaderships. The Bulgarian archives show the existence Jordan Baev OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 of intensive information exchange between the leftist guerrilla forces in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and the extent of the special aid received by them via Havana and Managua.
Soon after the Sandinista victory, the Sub-commission of InterAmerican Affairs held an important discussion on the "Cuban-Soviet" connections in the Western Hemisphere. Detailed information was presented by the vice-director of the DIA, the head of the Soviet and East-European Department at the CIA Political Analyses Office and other intelligence aces.
46 By the end 1980 the North-American intelligence services got also some documents of the Salvadorian Communist Party and Revolutionary People's Party which included data of armament and ammunitions delivered to the leftist rebels of El Salvador. Those materials showed that Bulgaria had delivered to the El Salvador guerrillas 300 sub-machine guns produced in Germany with 200 000 cartridges and 10 000 combat uniforms. Hungary and Czechoslovakia contributed considerable shares of material aid as well while Vietnam and the GDR supplied the biggest part of the armament.
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The archival documents show that the information circulated in the West in regard of the Bulgarian involvement in the Central American armament traffic was in general true.
The Bulgarian leadership received periodically classified summary information about the political situation in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras both -from delegations of these countries visiting Sofia and through the Bulgarian embassies in Havana, Managua and Mexico. Rather often the analyzed information came from Moscow, East Berlin and Prague (where the international communist periodical Problems of the Peace and Socialism had its main office).
In December 1980 a BCP Delegation, visiting Havana to participate in the Second Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, held long talks with four of the National Liberation Front "Farabundo Marti" [FMLN] leaders. The representative of the FMLN informed of their intentions to undertake an armed offensive in January 1981 and appealed for military, medical and other material assistance. The Bulgarian aid for the period 1981-1984 following summary data amounted to a total of 854 000 BG Lv, covering mainly infantry armament, medical supplies and clothing. In 1982 twenty wounded FMLN rebels arrived for medical treatment in Bulgaria, and following a resolution of the CC BCP of March 1983 the Bulgarian Red Cross sent a large quantity of medical supplies. The Bulgarian Politburo kept its regular contacts with functionaries of the Front of National Liberation "Farabundo Marti" and the Revolutionary Democratic Front of El Salvador till the end of 1989. After the disastrous earthquake in that country which result was more than 1500 deaths, the Bulgarian Red Cross sent humanitarian aid to the population affected by the disaster. At a session of the Expert group on the international information at the Warsaw Pact Political Committee held in June 1988 the Bulgarian delegation presented its assessment of the development of the multilateral discussions and the prospects to put the military and political crisis in El Salvador and Guatemala under control in the course of the next few months.
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The first contacts between Sofia and the four leftist resistance forces in Guatemala were established in 1979. In November 1980 those groups reached an agreement to build up a united front -The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity [URNG] . The united organization of the resistance forces announced its establishment in January 1982, and several months later a delegation of the URNG visited Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Communist Party maintained regular contacts not only with Guatemalan communists but also with the main armed force of the Front -the the Commander-in-chief of the Forces of the Armed Rebels [FAR] Pablo Monsanto \Jorge Soto Garcia\. During the talks in Sofia it was agreed that the Bulgarian side would cover the travel expenses of a large group of the Front activists who are to attend a special course in "guerrilla warfare" in Vietnam. In the same year through the Bulgarian Fatherland Front to the URNG medical supplies, food products and 150 tents of a total value of 80 000 BG Lv were sent via Cuba. . The request for training of Honduras rebels in Bulgaria was answered in the negative. At that time according to information received in Sofia, personnel of the Honduras rebel groups attended short-term military training courses in the USSR, the GDR and Cuba.
Obviously, following again the "division of tasks", the contacts with the newly established left radical fronts and guerrilla formations in Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica) in the 1980s were established by the BCP and the Fatherland Front. The BANU maintained relations with representatives of the so-called "moderate left" in Honduras. On invitation of the BANU in July 1983 a delegation of the Liberal National Union, the left wing of the Liberal party of Honduras visited Bulgaria. In 1981 in a report to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kiril Zlatkov, Bulgarian Ambassador in Costa Rica, analyzed the possibilities for extension of the political contacts with the major parties in that country. In that report he also pointed out that the BANU might create Soviet Bloc political relations with Latin American countries OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 2014 relations with the ruling party of the Democratic Renovation, with the republican Calderonist Party as well as to keep on maintaining its contacts with the National Liberation party of the ex-President Daniel Oduber The largest catholic state in the world (with population of 145 million people at the end of the 1980s), where one third of the practicing Catholics of the world live, and with the most impressive Episcopal synod (5 cardinals and 365 bishops), was understandably stricken by the news of the attempt on the life of the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope John-Paul II. However, the campaign related to the so-called "Bulgarian connection" never reached the extent and the effect it had in the Western Europe and the USA. The balanced approach predominated in the Brazil press and it gave a considerable space to the official Bulgarian version in regard of the accused Bulgarian citizens. In this respect certain important part should be assigned to the strong influence the radical "theology of liberation" had upon the Christian congregations in Brazil, which influence was noticed by Pope John Paul II during his visit there in 1983 too.
In March 1985 a Bulgarian delegation, led by Petar Tanchev, took part in the Presidential inauguration ceremony for Jose Sarney, the first in 20 years civilian President of Brazil who acquired the post through a "stroke of fate" following the sudden death of the President elected -Tancredo Neves. The BANU leader and Deputy Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria had talks with Jose Sarney, with the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jordan Baev OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 with Ulisses Guimaraes, Chairman of the Brazilian Democratic Movement and other Brazilian politicians 55 . A year later Ulisses Guimaraes and Leonel Brizola, leader of the Democratic Trabalhist party and Governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro received invitations from the BANU leadership to take part in the 35 th Congress of the BANU. Representatives of those two parties did take part in the BANU Congress and the meeting-dialogue, which took place after the Congress in Sofia. On their arriving back to Brazil, they presented a special report on that international forum to the House of Representatives
56
. When a Bulgarian parliamentary delegation visited Brazil in August 1988, the Communist deputies paid attention also to the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), whose leader Ignacio Lula da Silva ran in the presidential elections next year for the first time.
Apart of Brazil there was another Latin American country which sent to history the military dictatorship that had ruled it. After the restoration of the civil rule in Uruguay, in 1984 Julio Sanguinetti, the presidential candidate of the most influential party "Colorado", was elected for President of the country. The BANU established active contacts with the two most important forces in Uruguay. In 1985 Enrique Tarigo, Secretary General of the Battlist Party (Colorado), leader of one of the ruling party's wings, Vice-President of the country and a Presidential candidate subsequently, addressed a letter to Petar Tanchev, Secretary of the BANU to invite him to take part in the celebrations on the occasion of the 150 th Anniversary of the Party. On his part Tanchev invited the National leadership of "Colorado" and the leadership of the National Party (Blanco) to take part in 35 th BANU Congress. In July 1986 Uruguayan Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias visited Bulgaria, while in September 1987 Todor Zhivkov received an official invitation by the President of Uruguay to visit Montevideo. In 1987 the BANU invited the Chairman of the National Party, Ulysson Feriera in person as well as the leaders of some of the party's wings to visit Bulgaria. Following tha invitation Senator Blanco Alberto Sumaran, Secretary General of the party fraction "For the Homeland" and previous candidate for president of the country arrived in Sofia. He emphatically expressed his satisfaction from the talks he had had with representatives of the BANU -the first political party in Eastern Europe that his party established direct contacts with. Sumaran gave information about the situation in Uruguay and the efforts of Blanco to stabilize the "fragile democracy" founded in the country.
In June 1987 the leader of another wing of the National Party, Senator Luis Lacalle was in Bulgaria. It was his first visit in a Warsaw Pact country. Lacalle informed his Bulgarian hosts of the agreements reached 55 Zemedelsko Zname, Sofia, 16, 18, 19 March 1985. 56 BANU IRD Records, Information from Bulgarian ambassador in Brasil Georgi Gyurov, 7 October 1986. Soviet Bloc political relations with Latin American countries OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 at the meeting of the presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. In an interview with a correspondent of the highly regarded Spanish newspaper El Pais Luis Lacalle emphasized: "Though we proceed from different political conceptions, contacts with countries like Bulgaria are necessary." At the same time, Bulgarian Fatherland Front continued to maintain in the 1980s its close contacts with the leftist Frente Amplio, which leader Gen. Liber Seregni visited Bulgaria in September 1985, accompanied by a representative of the Christian Democratic Party.
In the time of Gen. Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship and predominantly in the mid-1980s the evolvement of two inside antipodal processes characterized the political opposition forces in Chile, i.e. -discord among the leaders of the different parties and tendency for uniting and regrouping on non-party principles. Differentiation and divisions occurred in the Christian-Democratic party, which split in three main wings, the Socialist party -in two main wings, and the MAPU party -in two main wings as well as within the Communist party. In the course of the nearly 15 year period after the military coup of Gen. Pinochet of September 1973 the Bulgarian political organizations maintained contacts mainly with representatives of the "extreme left" who appealed for military actions and "national uprising" against the dictatorship. Certain contacts were also maintained with some of the representatives of the "moderate" (socialdemocratic) left. While BCP continued to maintain close relations with the Communist Party and the Socialist Party faction of Clodomiro Almeyda, the best relations of the BANU were with political figures of the MAPU (labour-agrarian) party. In May 1989 with the assistance of BANU in the resort town of Bankya, not far from Sofia was held a clandestine meeting of above mentioned party's leaders, led by its Secretary General Claudio Ramos (Cesario Flores). Though not regular, contacts were also maintained with the Christian left and the Radical party whose representatives were invited to the BANU congresses in 1981 and 1986. In 1988 the BANU leadership made certain efforts to establish contacts with the most influential opposition force -the Christian Democratic party (PDC). In June 1988 a Chilean agrarian delegation composed of PDC's activists visited Bulgaria. The BANU Secretary, Petar Tanchev sent through the delegation a letter to the PDC Chairman, Patricio Aylwin, inviting him to visit Bulgaria for "exchanging views on future collaboration" between the two parties. The account of the BANU's international activities in 1988, approved on a session of the BANU leadership in January 1989, pointed out: "Taking into consideration the results of the recently held referendum in Chile and the fact that the Chilean Christian Democratic party appears to be a leading alternative force in a future democratic government, we should most highly evaluate the contact established with that party…". As a matter Jordan Baev OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 of fact, though, no real working contacts between the BANU and the PDC were established. Patricio Aylwin's becoming the new President of Chile on March 11 th 1990 and Bulgaria's adopting the route of pluralistic democracy after the changes of November 10 th 1989, made possible the renewal of the diplomatic relations between the two countries after 17 years of break and it took place on April 6 th 1990. In spite of the effect the petrol crisis had on the Mexican economy, the Bulgarian-Mexican relations kept on developing during the presidential turn of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado who won the expected absolute majority in 1982 with appeals for "revolutionary nationalism", "social democracy" and "national unity". However, the financial and economic crisis in Mexico in the beginning of the 1980s had its negative effect also on the bilateral economic cooperation with Bulgaria and other East European countries. We should put an end to the formal approach and should not limit our relations within the prescriptions of protocol, they are to become more dynamic and to be amenable to the part and position our two political formations hold in the their respective countries as well as to our politic responsibilities at this moment of radical changes in the international life.
The energy crisis of the late 1970s seriously affected the leading petrol producer of Latin America -Venezuela. That reflected on the bilateral diplomatic and economic relations between Bulgaria and Venezuela. During Soviet Bloc political relations with Latin American countries OPSIS, Catalão-GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 the rule of the Social-Christian Party, COPEI, the political contacts between the two countries were realized mainly through the BANU. At his visit in Caracas in 1980 Svetla Daskalova, Minister of Justice and member of the BANU leadership, was received by the President Luis Herrera Campins and had talks with the leaders of the main opposition party Gonzalo Barrios and Jaime Lusinchi. In May 1982 the head of BANU, Petar Tanchev was also received by the President of Venezuela and had talks with the leadership of the ruling party COPEI (Comite de Orientacion Politica Electoral Independiente). At the request of BANU's leadership the Bulgarian Ambassador in Caracas handed Jaime Lusinchi, Secretary of the Democratic Movement (AD), an invitation to visit Sofia. The Bulgarian Embassy had in the due course informed Sofia that Lusinchi had an extremely good chance to win the forthcoming presidential elections in Venezuela.
At the presidential election that took place in the end of 1982 Jaime Lusinchi had achieved a most convincing victory. A Bulgarian delegation, led by Petar Tanchev, was present at his inauguration ceremony in February the following year. Tanchev handed the new Venezuelan President a letter with an invitation for him to visit Bulgaria from the Bulgarian head of state, Todor Zhivkov. The leader of BANU had meetings with the Chairman of the ruling Accion Democratica party as well as with Jovito Villalba, the leader of the smaller party -partner in the coalition cabinet, the Republican Democratic Union. Following an invitation from the BANU, Villalba visited Bulgaria in June 1984. At his talks with Petar Tanchev in Sofia in July 1986 Ruben Carpio, Chairman of the Commission of Foreign Policy at the Senate of Venezuela, defined the relations between the Accion Democratica and the BANU as "excellent". In May 1987 in a letter of his, addressed to the Venezuelan President, Tanchev pointed out: "We believe that a visit of yours in our country and your talks with our head of Party and state would open a much wider span of possibilities for the development of allembracing collaboration between Bulgaria and Venezuela". Information of the Bulgarian Embassy in Caracas stated that an eventual visit of Lusinchi in Bulgaria after his already scheduled visits to Italy and Yugoslavia had actually been discussed but the inner political situation and the confrontation among the different groups in the party had forestalled the realization of that plan. In September 1988, at the eve of the new presidential elections Angel Dimitrov, Secretary of the BANU visited Venezuela at an invitation from the Accion Democratica. The Venezuelan President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leaders of the ruling party received him. In his report on the visit Dimitrov informed of the discussed possibilities for increasing the dynamics of the bilateral relations between the two countries and forecasted that the nearly sure election of Carlos Andres Perez for President of the country might open new vistas for the development of the official Bulgarian-Venezuelan relations. At a meeting with official Bulgarian representatives after his victory and assuming the presidential post, the new President of Venezuela expressed his conviction that the "relations between the two countries will develop in a more energetic and dynamic way". A month later, induced by the economic crisis, social disturbances (the so-called "Caracaso") broke out in Venezuela and caused one of the most serious political crises in that country's contemporary history.
In one to the neighboring to Venezuela countries, Colombia, the fragile parlamentary democracy kept on being just a formal stage screen for the civil war, rioting in there from the 1940s on. In view of that inner political situation it might be assumed that the political relations between Colombia and Bulgaria would be extremely restrained. As a matter of fact, the 'dirty war" affected to a certain extent mainly the economic relations between the countries while characteristic for the political ones was their stable development. A solid base for that were the intensive contacts established with the leaders of the two main political forces -the Conservative and the Liberal parties. As early as 1985 on behalf of the BANU Senator Luis Carlos Galan, the popular leader of the New Liberalism party was invited to visit Bulgaria. His visit in Bulgaria took place in June 1987.
61 Two years later, in August 1989, the most probable future president of Colombia was killed by the contract assassins of the "drug cartel". That gave the Colombian government reason to open a total war to the "narcobarons" from Medelin and Cali which resulted in the arrest of the most notorious of them but did not bring about the total extermination of the organized crime in the country. GO, v. 14, n. Especial, p. 305-338, 2014 In th 1988 in Sofia a Memorandum of Cooperation was signed between the BANU and the APRA. According to that memorandum the two parties were to cooperate for the sake of "interaction in the field of international activities", exchange of information, joint activities in the sphere of education and publishing, exchange of work-groups and so on. On May 16 th 1988 Petar Tanchev sent letter of congratulations to Armando Villanueva on the occasion of his election for Prime Minister of Peru.
In a meeting during his visit to Sofia with Dimitar Stanishev, BCP Secretary for International Affairs Armando Villanueva suggested also the establishment of inter-party relations between the two ruling parties. In September 1988 a Declaration for cooperation between APRA and BCP was signed in Lima, where it was underlined "the existence of similar views on broad issues about the international situation". At the same time, Fatherland of the the christian democratic party of the National Democracy of the ex-president Urtado. Army General-of-the Reserve Rene Vargas, exCommander-in-Chief of the ground forces of Ecuador, who had received his training in Fort Gulig and other Pentagon bases, was visiting a "Soviet Bloc" country for the first time. At that, his visit took place at the eve of the destruction of the "Berlin Wall", the mental barrier between the Eastern and Western Europe. In his official statements made during his stay in Bulgaria Gen. Vargas said that he was impressed with the "achievements of the socialist Bulgaria" 67 . In private conversations, though, he did not miss the oportunity to express his irony and sceptisism caused by the substantial discrepancy between the display of make-believe and the reality 68 . That was one of the last visits of political figures from Latin America paid to a small communist Balkan country just before the destroying of the political system established in the East-European countries under the Soviet pressure and on a Soviet pattern after the World War II. * * * The demolition of the Berlin Wall as a monument of the division between Eastern and Western Europe symbolized as well the fall of the Communist regimes in the region. On the same day when the Berlin Wall break up started, the longest ever Communist ruler in Eastern Europe, Todor Zhivkov was forced by some of his most close collaborators (with indirect pressure by Moscow) to leave the power. After the political changes in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany, it was the next dramatic event, which was followed a week later in Czechoslovakia and a month later in Romania. The fateful turn in Eastern Europe provoked a sharp indicative reaction by the former Latin American ally -the Cuban leadership. On 23 November 1989 the Bulgarian embassy in Havana informed Sofia that the actual political events in Bulgaria were met with negative and restrained comments by the Cuban authorities because they "were not certain of the correctness of the CC BCP decisions". On the other hand, it was perceived "increasing doubts among the Cuban functionaries about the rightness of Mikhail Gorbachev's policy" at all. Another ciphered telegram from the Bulgarian embassy three weeks later informed Sofia about a Fidel Castro . The radical changes in the Bulgarian political system influenced this country's relations with Latin America, too. The intensive contacts at different political and state levels between Bulgaria and Latin America were nearly completely cut down in the first years of post-Communist transition, and the official bilateral relations became rather symbolic.The development of the internal political process in Nicaragua and electoral loss of the Sandinistas caused additionally significant corrections in the Warsaw Pact countries' policy in Central America as well and their urgent withdrawal from the region. Relations suffered drastic changes after the "velvet revolutions" in Eastern Europe, as Fidel Castro predicted. Soon after the "palace coup" on 10 November 1989 in Bulgaria the bilateral ties with Cuba, which were established on a purely ideological base, deteriorated visibly. Several new Bulgarian periodicals in the beginning of 1990 for the first time criticized the Castro regime defects, while the correspondent of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in Havana, Andrei Apostolov even tried to suggest a definition for the specific model of the "tropical bureaucratic socialism" in Cuba. Though in 1990 Bulgaria had a Socialist government, headed by Andrei Lukanov, the relations with Cuba undergo a short period of deterioration. After the representatives of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria at UN Committee of Human Rights in Geneva vote in support of a resolution regarding human rights in Cuba, in a public speech on 7 March 1990 Fidel Castro strongly criticized his allies of not too long ago: "If an aggression is undertaken against our island, the responsibility for the blood shed will rest with the leaderships of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria…" This sharp critique was followed as well by some Latin American Communist periodicals. 
Conclusion
Since the end of the Cold War the Bulgarian civil society has reassessed the ideological and political motivation of the economic and military support given to the "Third World" countries in the course of the previous three decades. Nowadays new interpretations and questions come forward in regard of that "special assistance". At what point does it go beyond the accepted international norms and in what degree does it turn from a natural obligation under the spirit and according to the international community's principles into an unjustified "burden" to the economy of the small Bulgaria? The generous free aid extended to left radical fronts and movements in many cases with no doubt was dictated by political propaganda motives and matter of prestige in the "united antiimperialist struggle" and was by no means within the limited resource and economic possibilities of Bulgaria, especially during the period of the intensifying economic recession of the 1980's. Though, the opposite US propaganda of Soviet bloc "subversive support for terrorist groups" in the region as a principal reason for the civil wars and bitter political confrontations evades the real problems and disguises their own harsh interference in Latin American internal affairs.
It is definitely hard to understand, however, the practical base of the gradual intensification of the political contacts between Latin America and the Warsaw Pact countries from the 1960s until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unlike the Middle East region, the East European governments had no any significant projects for economic cooperation with the Latin American countries. It would be incorrect and strange as well to explain the contacts of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe with some influential political parties in power in Latin America just on the base of a probable delivery of financial and material aid, as happened, for instance, with their new partners in the decolonized Africa and Asia. In some way, such intentions could be explained with the policy of so called Soviet bloc "peace offensives" aiming to gain more allies in the Third World periphery of the global bipolar confrontation. On the other hand, many Latin American political leaders used to propagate the theories for unification of the "smallest" countries against the domination of the "biggest" empires. Thus, one of the main reasons for such phenomena -the new and actual discovery of the Western Hemisphere by the East European elites, was grounded on more or less manifested common feelings against the hegemony of the Western superpower -the United States of America. The whole diverse story of Soviet bloc parallel multiple contacts with various political circles in Latin America showed at least that the previous uniform and schematic views on 
